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Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs)—large pools of government-owned or -controlled funds that are invested in whole or in part 
outside their home countries—have existed for nearly five decades but began to attract international attention only a few years 
ago. Their explosive growth up until 2007 fanned widespread anxieties about shifts of global economic wealth and the role of 
governments in managing that wealth. In 2003, assets under management of SWFs were about $0.5 trillion, but by 2007, they 
had increased six times to $3 trillion and were projected optimistically to reach $12 trillion by 2015. This rapid growth was seen 
as a threat in many countries receiving SWF investments. On the other hand, SWF investments assisted some major Western 
financial institutions that were under financial stress weather the recent global financial crisis.
The rapid expansion of SWFs was fueled by high and rising prices of natural resources and other commodities and by 
policies that led to massive accumulations of foreign exchange and financial resources in government coffers. To a significant 
degree, this wealth was accumulating under the control of countries that did not entirely share in the history, culture, and forms 
of government of the United States and of Western European countries. Excluding pension funds, seven countries have SWFs 
with international assets of more than $100 billion: United Arab Emirates, Norway, Singapore, Russia, Kuwait, Hong Kong, and 
China. Saudi Arabia’s international investment holdings often are placed in the same category. Only one country, Norway, is a 
member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the traditional grouping of wealthy nations. 
Sovereign wealth funds are symbolic of two major, recent trends in the global political economy: (1) a redistribution of 
wealth and economic and financial power from the United States, Europe, and other mature industrial economies to countries 
perceived to be less firmly grounded in similar economic, financial, and political mores; and (2) an increasing role of governments 
in managing wealth and economic power in today’s world. 
A government’s decisions about its international investments, including decisions by an SWF under its control, affect the 
interests of four key groups: the government of the country with the SWF, the citizens of those countries, financial market 
participants at home and abroad, and governments and citizens in other countries. 
Given such wide potential impacts, SWFs raise concerns in five broad areas: (1) mismanagement of investments by SWFs 
to the economic and financial detriment of the country with the fund; (2) pursuit of political or economic power objectives 
(or both) via SWFs; (3) exacerbation of financial protectionism that may be inspired by actual or imagined threats from SWFs;   
(4) the potential for financial market turmoil and uncertainty associated with SWF activities; and (5) conflicts between countries 
with SWFs and countries in which they invest, for example, with respect to behavior and regulatory treatment.
As is appropriate and desirable when international controversies emerge, responsible policymakers have sought multilateral 
solutions to address these concerns and, to that end, the involvement of multilateral institutions—the International Monetary 
Fund, World Bank, and OECD. Outside observers, including the author of this book, Edwin M. Truman, suggested the devel-
opment of a set of standards for SWFs. Truman, one of the pioneers of independent, policy-oriented research on SWFs, advocated 
in 2007 a voluntary set of international best practices in accountability and transparency for the SWFs and developed a prototype 
in the form of an SWF “scoreboard.” His SWF scoreboard helped to inspire the Generally Accepted Principles and Practices 
of SWFs (known as the Santiago Principles or the GAPP), which were agreed by the International Working Group (IWG) on 
SWFs and released in October 2008, setting out the first international agreement on these institutions and their practices. The 
International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IFSWF) is the successor body of the IWG working on implementation of the 
Santiago Principles.  2
Table 1     Sovereign wealth fund scoreboard and the Santiago Principles 
Countrya Funda SWF scoreboard 
Santiago 
Principles 
Norway Government Pension Fund-Global  97 96
United States  California Public Employees’ Retirement System  95 96
New Zealand Superannuation Fund  94 98
Canada Canada Pension Plan  92 96
United States  Alaska Permanent Fund  92 96
Wyoming Permanent Mineral Trust Fund  91 96
Canada  Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec 89 98
France Fonds de reserve pour les retraites 89 92
Ireland National Pensions Reserve Fund  86 94
Netherlands Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP  85 84
Timor-Leste  Petroleum Fund  85 80
Japan  Government Pension Investment Fund  84 89
Canada Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan  83 86
Trinidad and Tobago  Heritage and Stabilization Fund  83 82
Australia  Future Fund  80 90
United States  New Mexico Severance Tax Permanent Fund  80 80
Thailand Government Pension Fund  78 81
Azerbaijan  State Oil Fund  76 76
Canada  Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund  74 80
Singapore  Temasek Holdings 73 82
Chile Economic and Social Stabilization Fund  71 70
China National Social Security Fund  70 74
Hong Kong Exchange Fund  70 74
Chile Pension Reserve Fund  68 68
United States  Alabama Trust Fund  68 76
Kazakhstan  National Fund  65 67
Singapore  Government of Singapore Investment Corporation  65 78
Kuwait Kuwait Investment Authority  63 71
Korea Korea Investment Corporation  60 67
United Arab Emirates  Mubadala Development Company  59 66
China  China Investement Corporation  57 60
Botswana  Pula Fund  56 62
United Arab Emirates  Dubai International Capital  55 62
Russia Reserve Fund and National Wealth Fund  50 52
São Tomé and Príncipe  National Oil Account  48 58
Malaysia  Khazanah Nasional  44 48
Mexico  Oil Income Stabilization Fund  44 42
Kiribati  Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund  35 44
Vietnam  State Capital Investment Corporation  35 42
(continues on next page)3
This book is the culmination of a three-year research program at the Peterson Institute for International Economics on this 
topic. Truman reviews the origins of SWFs, the potential for their future growth, the policy issues that they raise, and various 
proposals for the regulation of SWFs. He concludes that the best approach is a robust set of best practices for SWFs and a high 
degree of compliance with that standard. To this end, he updates the SWF scoreboard and extends it to 53 pension and nonpension 
funds in 37 countries. He reports on the considerable progress since 2007 in compliance by some funds with the 33 elements in 
the scoreboard. 
The elements are grouped in four categories: (1) structure of the fund, including its objectives, links to the government’s fiscal 
policy, and whether the fund is independent from the countries’ international reserves; (2) governance of the fund, including the 
roles of the government, the board of the fund and its managers, and whether the fund follows guidelines for corporate responsi-
bility; (3) accountability and transparency of the fund in its investment strategy, investment activities, reporting, and audits; and 
(4) behavior of the fund in managing its portfolio and its risk management policies, including the use of leverage and derivatives.
Based on the scores as of the end of 2009, the 53 SWFs fall into three broad groups: 14 funds score above 80 percent, 14 funds 
score at or below 30 percent, and 25 funds are in a middle group. The top group includes funds of two developing countries, Timor-
Leste and Trinidad and Tobago, as well as nine pension and three nonpension SWFs from industrial countries. The middle group 
includes funds of nonindustrial countries as diverse as Russia, Mexico, Kuwait, and Singapore as well as Australia’s Future Fund 
and the SWF of the province of Alberta, Canada. The bottom group includes four funds from the United Arab Emirates, two from 
Dubai and two from Abu Dhabi, one of which was the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) as of the end of 2009. However, 
in March 2010, the ADIA released its first annual report and raised its score to the average for all SWFs.
Truman provides a positive assessment of the Santiago Principles as a first step toward high quality best practices for SWFs. 
Table 1 presents a summary of the scores of the 53 funds on the 33 elements in the scoreboard and 25 elements in the Santiago 
Principles that overlap with those in the scoreboard. Full compliance of an SWF with the Santiago Principles alone would receive 
a score of only 76 on the scoreboard. 
Table 1     Sovereign wealth fund scoreboard and the Santiago Principles (continued)
Countrya Funda SWF scoreboard 
Santiago 
Principles 
Bahrain  Mumtalakat Holding Company  30 32
Algeria  Revenue Regulation Fund  29 32
Iran Oil Stabilization Fund  29 32
Nigeria  Excess Crude Account  29 34
Venezuela  Macroeconomic Stabilization Fund  27 28
National Development Fund 27 25
United Arab Emirates  International Petroleum Investment Company 26 26
Oman  State General Reserve Fund  23 26
Brunei Darussalam  Brunei Investment Agency  21 28
United Arab Emirates  Investment Corporation of Dubai 21 22
Sudan  Oil Revenue Stabilization Account  18 16
Qatar Qatar Investment Authority 15 15
United Arab Emirates Istithmar World 15 16
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 11 12
Total:
IFSWF funds 63 67
IFSWF countries  64 67
Pension SWFs 84 88
Nonpension SWFs 50 54
All SWFs 59 62
a. Countries and their funds that are members of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IFSWF) are shown in italics.
Notes: The SWF scoreboard includes 33 elements on a scale of 100. The Santiago Principles include 25 of these elements also on a scale of 100.4
As a result of the Santiago Principles and other parallel efforts at education, such as the SWF scoreboard that Truman has 
featured in his research, a substantial amount of distrust surrounding SWFs has been defused. Unfortunately, reciprocal actions 
by host countries to SWF investments have been less than impressive in recent years with respect to their openness to foreign 
direct investment. OECD members agreed that no special regime for SWF investments is required because those investments are 
(rightly) seen as not inherently different from other government-owned or -controlled investment vehicles. But these countries 
did not address how to strengthen their current codes, procedures, and practices to reinforce their openness to foreign invest-
ments, including by governments and their SWFs. Instead, and partly as a consequence of the rise of SWFs, there recently has 
been a tangible increase in financial protectionism in OECD countries via a tightening of laws, standards, and procedures. 
The United States, in its Foreign Investment and National Security Act passed in 2007, updated the legislation governing the 
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, to tighten that framework, which had the effect of raising the costs of 
investing in the United States by governments and their SWFs.
Truman concludes with four broad recommendations: First, countries with SWFs should promote adherence to and imple-
mentation of the Santiago Principles and the progressive improvement of the quality and content of those principles to the level of 
his SWF scoreboard. Second, recipient countries should take reciprocal steps to monitor more closely incipient financial protec-
tionism put in place in recent years with a view to rolling it back, for example, by narrowing exemptions from national treatment 
and opening up decisions to ex post review. Third, to prevent regulatory and institutional arbitrage by diverting funding to other 
state-controlled entities such as banks and nonfinancial institutions, governments should step up their collaborative efforts in 
order to improve other accountability and transparency standards, such as those on the management of foreign exchange reserves, 
and to collect more comprehensive data on all cross-border government investments. Fourth, the long-term goal should be a 
comprehensive, internationally agreed-upon framework governing all types of cross-border investments by governments.
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